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PROVABLY TRUE SENTENCES ACROSS AXIOMATIZATIONS OF
KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH
CARLO NICOLAI
LMU MUNICH
Abstract. We study the relationships between two clusters of axiomatizations of Kripke’s
fixed-point models for languages containing a self-applicable truth predicate. The first cluster
is represented by what we will call ‘PKF-like’ theories, originating in recent work Halbach and
Horsten, whose axioms and rules (in Basic De Morgan Logic) are all valid in fixed-point models;
the second by ‘KF-like’ theories first introduced by Solomon Feferman, that lose this property
but reflect the classicality of the metatheory in which Kripke’s construction is carried out.
We show that to any natural system in one cluster – corresponding to natural variations on
induction schemata – there is a corresponding system in the other proving the same sentences
true, addressing a problem left open by Halbach and Horsten and accomplishing a suitably
modified version of the project sketched by Reinhardt aiming at an instrumental reading of
classical theories of self-applicable truth.
1. Introduction
Kripke’s Outline of a Theory of Truth [13] can be reasonably considered one of the most influ-
ential works on truth and the liar paradox since Tarski’s seminal paper [22]. By employing the
metamathematics of inductive definitions, Kripke provides a class of models (fixed-point mod-
els) for a language containing a truth predicate in which any sentence φ has the same semantic
value as the sentence ‘φ is true’. This approximates the fundamental intuition that the thought
expressed by φ coincides with the thought expressed by ‘φ is true’. In Kripke’s original construc-
tion, however, a liar sentence λ will be neither (definitely) true nor (definitely) false. The ‘logic’
of the models is forced to be nonclassical.1
The recent literature offers two main alternatives to axiomatize Kripke’s semantic construc-
tion: on the one hand, one can remain faithful to the reasoning available in fixed-point models
and resort only to rules and axioms that are sound with respect to these models. We will be
interested in a particular collection of theories of this sort that we will call ‘the PKF-like cluster’
from the name of its most studied representative PKF – from ‘Partial Kripke-Feferman’ – first
introduced in [9]. Alternatively, one may remain faithful to the classicality of the metatheory
in which the class of models is given: to this route corresponds a collection of theories that we
call ‘the KF-cluster’ from the name of the well-known system KF – from ‘Kripke-Feferman’ –
introduced in [3, 6].
KF and PKF are, in a sense, on a par: they share compositional truth-theoretic principles and
feature open-ended induction principles. What they don’t share, of course, is the underlying logic,
for the reasons sketched above. It is therefore at least surprising that PKF and KF spectacularly
diverge in their proof-theoretic strength (see again [6, 8]): PKF proves the same arithmetical
1We will employ a more general variant of the construction which can be found, for instance, in [8], in which
λ will be neither true nor false or both true and false.
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sentences as PA plus arithmetical transfinite induction up to any ordinal smaller than ϕω0,
2 or as
the theory of ramified truth up to ωω. KF, by contrast, matches the arithmetical consequences of
PA plus arithmetical induction up to any ordinal smaller than ϕε00, or of ramified truth up to ε0.
This also means that PKF, although preserving the ‘internal’ reasoning available in a fixed-point
model, cannot deem true many sentences that are nonetheless forced by KF into the extension
of the truth predicate. This already leads to the natural question of finding a subtheory of KF
whose theorems of the form Tpφq coincide with claims of the same form derivable in PKF. This
problem was already considered by Halbach and Horsten in [9], where it was also asked whether
the theory in question could be KFI, a version of KF featuring only internal truth induction ([9,
p. 701]). Corollary 3 answers this question positively.
Similarly, it seems natural to investigate whether there is a system, in the PKF-cluster, that
declares true the same sentences as KF. Corollary 4, in combination with Corollary 1, identifies
this system in PKF extended with a transfinite induction rule for the truth language up to any
ordinal smaller than ε0. The technique employed to obtain Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 amounts
to a formalization, in suitable PKF-like theories, of a variant of the asymmetric interpretation
for normalized derivations in KF-like theories given by Cantini in [3].
In the next section we introduce PKF- and KF-like theories in their logical, arithmetical,
and truth-theoretic components. §3 surveys and extends previous work on the inclusion of the
provably true sentences in PKF-like theories in suitable KF-like theories. §4 is devoted to the
proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4. §5 summarizes the results obtained in previous sections and suggests
that the resulting picture partially accomplishes a variant of a program sketched by Reinhardt
in [19].
2. Logic, arithmetic, truth
In the present section we introduce the main components of the system PKF of [9] (see also [8])
and of some of its natural variants. This amounts to introducing their underlying logic BDM,
their arithmetical (or syntactic) part, and their truth-theoretic principles. We also introduce
the classical theory KF from [6] and recall why PKF, KF and their extensions can be considered
axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed-point models.
We start with the language L of arithmetic equipped with finitely many function symbols for
suitable primitive recursive functions and expand it with a primitive predicate T: we call the
resulting language LT.
Definition 1.
(i) A four-valued model of LT is a tuple (M, S1, S2) where M is a model of the language L
and S1, S2 ⊆M (the domain of M) are the extension and antiextension of T. We allow
S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅ and S1 ∪ S2 6= M .
(ii) If S1 ∪ S2 = M , we call (M, S1, S2) complete. If S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, we call it consistent.
(iii) A four-valued model (M, S1, S2) is called symmetric when S1 ∩S2 = ∅ or S1 ∪S2 = M .
We define the relation DM obtaining between four-valued models and formulas of LT. For
simplicity, we extend LT to a language LMT featuring new constants c¯ for all c ∈ M . When
N is the standard model, we can safely take LMT = LT. The mapping ·M : TermLMT → M is
defined in the usual way.
2See §2 for the definition of the Veblen functions.
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Definition 2 (Basic De Morgan evaluation schema). Let (M, S1, S2) be a four-valued model,
s, t be closed terms of LMT , φ, ψ sentences of LMT , and χ(v) formulas of LMT with only the variable
displayed free.
(M, S1, S2) DM s = t iff sM = tM
(M, S1, S2) DM s 6= t iff sM 6= tM
(M, S1, S2) DM Tt iff tM ∈ S1
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬Tt iff tM ∈ S2
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬¬φ iff (M, S1, S2) DM φ
(M, S1, S2) DM φ ∧ ψ iff (M, S1, S2) DM φ and (M, S1, S2) DM ψ
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬(φ ∧ ψ) iff (M, S1, S2) DM ¬φ or (M, S1, S2) DM ¬ψ
(M, S1, S2) DM φ ∨ ψ iff (M, S1, S2) DM φ or (M, S1, S2) DM ψ
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬(φ ∨ ψ) iff (M, S1, S2) DM ¬φ and (M, S1, S2) DM ¬ψ
(M, S1, S2) DM ∀vχ iff for all c ∈M , (M, S1, S2) DM χ(c¯)
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬∀vχ iff there exists a c ∈M such that (M, S1, S2) DM ¬χ(c¯)
(M, S1, S2) DM ∃vχ iff there is a c ∈M such that (M, S1, S2) DM χ(c¯)
(M, S1, S2) DM ¬∃vχ iff for all c ∈M , (M, S1, S2) DM ¬χ(c¯)
The label ‘four-valued models’ derives from the properties of propositional connectives that can
be easily extracted from Definition 2. A sequent is an expression of the form Γ⇒ ∆, where Γ,∆
are finite sets of formulas. Definition 2 can be extended to sequents. For simplicity, I give the
definition of BDM-satisfaction for sequents involving sets of sentences but it should be clear how
to extend it to sets of formulas by means of variable assignments.
Definition 3. Let (M, S1, S2) be again a four-valued model. Then (M, S1, S2) DM Γ ⇒ ∆ if
and only if both the following conditions hold:
(i) if for all φ ∈ Γ, (M, S1, S2) DM φ, then there is a ψ ∈ ∆ such that (M, S1, S2) DM ψ;
(ii) if for all ψ ∈ ∆, (M, S1, S2) DM ¬ψ, then there is a φ ∈ Γ such that (M, S1, S2) DM ¬φ.
To the satisfaction relation DM we associate the following notion of logical consequence with
multiple conclusion. Again it is convenient to consider finite sets of sentences.
Definition 4. Let Γ,∆ be finite sets of sentences and C a class of four-valued models. Then
Γ C ∆ if and only if, for all M∈ C, also M DM Γ⇒ ∆.
We will often be concerned with the case in which C is a class of four-valued models of a set S
of appropriate non-logical inferences of the form
(1)
{Γi, φi ⇒ ψi,∆i}ki=1
Γ, φ⇒ ψ,∆
where φ, φi, ψ, ψi are formulas and Γi,∆i finite sets of formulas. In this case we will directly
write Γ S ∆ instead to referring to the class of models C. In (1) k can be 0: in this case the
inference is simply a nonlogical initial sequent.
The logic associated with this notion of logical consequence can be seen as a multiple-
conclusion variant of the four-valued logic introduced in [1] that, besides the preservations of
the values ‘true’ and ‘both true and false’, also prescribes the anti-preservation of ‘false’ and
‘both true and false’. Following [7], we call it Basic De Morgan Logic as it guarantees the
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standard De Morgan transformations of the positive connectives ∧,∨. If we focus on symmetric
models, we obtain the logic considered in [12, 9] that cannot distinguish between gluts (sentences
in S1 ∩ S2) and gaps (sentences not in S1 ∪ S2).
We now introduce a two-sided sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to
the notion of logical consequence introduced in Definition 4: we call this system BDM.
Definition 5 (BDM). Initial sequents are of the form φ ⇒ φ, where φ is an atomic or negated
atomic formula of LT (literal). We have the following logical rules of inference:
Γ⇒ ∆, φ φ,Γ⇒ ∆
(CUT)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(WL)
Γ, φ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(WR)
Γ⇒ φ,∆
Γ⇒ ¬∆
(¬R)
∆⇒ ¬Γ
¬Γ⇒ ∆
(¬L)¬∆⇒ Γ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
(∧R)
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ∧ ψ
φ, ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
(∧L)
φ ∧ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ, ψ
(∨R)
Γ⇒ ∆, φ ∨ ψ
φ,Γ⇒ ∆ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
(∨L)
φ ∨ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
χ(t),Γ⇒ ∆
(∀L)∀xχ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, φ(x)
(∀R)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀xφ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ(t)
(∃R)
Γ⇒ ∆,∃xφ
χ(x),Γ⇒ ∆
(∃L)∃xχ,Γ⇒ ∆
Remark 1.
(i) rules on the first line are structural inferences;
(ii) in ¬R and ¬L, ¬Γ and ¬∆ denote the finite sets of negations of formulas in Γ and ∆
respectively;
(iii) in ∀R and ∃L, the variable x is not free in the lower sequent;
(iv) complex formulas introduced in the lower sequent are called principal, the corresponding
formulas in the upper sequents are called auxiliary, and Γ,∆ are the side formulas. We
write `S for derivability in BDM plus an additional set of nonlogical inference S;
(v) a symmetric variant of BDM, that we call SDM, can be obtained by adding to BDM the
initial sequent
(GG) φ,¬φ⇒ ψ,¬ψ
A version of Lemma 1 below can be obtained for SDM relative to symmetric models;
(vi) classical logic K is obtained by extending BDM with the negation rules
φ,Γ⇒ ∆
(¬1)
Γ⇒ ∆,¬φ
Γ⇒ ∆, φ
(¬2)¬φ,Γ⇒ ∆
BDM is closed under (¬1), (¬2) for formulas φ provided that it can also prove ⇒ φ,¬φ;
(vii) the usual substitution, inversion, cut-elimination lemmata hold for BDM;
(viii) for S a set of non-logical rules of inference of the form (1), we write S ` φ for ‘the sequent
⇒ φ is provable in from S’.
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Lemma 1 (Adequacy). `S Γ⇒ ∆ if and only if Γ S ∆.
The soundness direction of Lemma 1 is straighforward. For a proof of the completeness direction
we refer to [2, 17].
Definition 6. The system BDM= (similarly for SDM=) is obtained by adding to BDM the
nonlogical initial sequents
⇒ r0 = r0(=1)
r0 = r1, φ(r0)⇒ φ(r1)(=2)
for r0, r1 arbitrary terms of LT.
Once identity is in the language, the arithmetical component of PKF is readily introduced:
Definition 7 (basic, basik). The system basic consists of BDM= in LT plus all initial sequents
⇒ φ with φ an axiom of Peano Arithmetic PA different from the induction schema or a defining
equation for the (finitely many) additional symbols for primitive recursive functions that we
require. We call basik the result of adding the arithmetical initial sequents to classical logic K
plus the identity initial sequents.
Variations on induction schemata will play an important role in what follows: for simplicity
to deal with the relationships between internal and external induction, we formulate induction
schemata and rules for formulas with exactly one free variable, but nothing essential rests on this
assumption. More specifically, we will mainly focus on induction rules over basic, as the schema
(IND0) ⇒ φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(x+ 1))→ ∀xφ(x)
for φ(v) a formula of LT may fail to be sound when we have BDM or subclassical variants in the
background.3
Definition 8.
(i) Full LT induction has the form
φ(x),Γ⇒ ∆, φ(x+ 1)
(IND1)
φ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, φ(r)
with φ(0) a sentence of LT, x not occurring free in Γ,∆, φ(0), and r an arbitrary term.
(ii) We will also consider the following rule of internal induction whose formulation requires
the representation in basic of some syntactic notions and operations (cf. the compre-
hensive list in §2.2). In particular, Fml1LT(·, ·) represents in basic (and of course also in
basik) the relation obtaining between LT-formulas with one free variable and their free
variable:
Fml1LT(x, u),Tx(y˙/u),Γ⇒ ∆,Tx( ˙y + 1/u)
(IND2)
Tx(p0q/u),Γ⇒ ∆,Tx(z˙/u)
In (IND2) z is an eigenvariable and x(y˙/u) expresses formal substitution in x of u with
the numeral for y.
We notice however that, over basik, the schemata (IND0) and (IND1) are equivalent due to the
classical rules for the negation and the conditional.
3To show that there are unsound instances of the induction schema, one can for instance employ the formula
λ ∧ y = y as relevant instance of IND0.
PROVABLY TRUE SENTENCES ACROSS AXIOMATIZATIONS OF KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH 6
2.1. Ordinals. For our purposes it is sufficient to assume a notation system of ordinals up to
the least strongly critical ordinal Γ0 as it is carried out in, e.g., [18, Ch. 3]. We recall the main
properties of a suitable such notation.
A non-zero ordinal α is principal if it cannot be expressed as ζ + η for ζ, η < α. Starting with
principal ordinals, one can define the class C(α) of α-critical ordinals by transfinite induction by
letting
C(0) := ‘the class of principal ordinals’
C(α+ 1) := ‘the class of fixed points of the function enumerating C(α)’
C(λ) :=
⋂
ζ<λ
C(ζ) for λ a limit ordinal
The Veblen functions ϕα are the enumerating functions of C(α). The class of strongly critical
ordinals SC contains precisely the ordinals α that are themselves α-critical. Γζ indicates the ζ-th
strongly critical ordinal. Principal ordinals α that are not themselves strongly critical are such
that α = ϕζη for η, ζ < α (see [18, Lem. 3.4.17]). Therefore, by this fact and Cantor’s normal
form theorem, ordinals < Γ0 can be uniquely determined as words of the alphabet (0,+, ϕ··).
Lemma 2. Assuming a standard primitive recursive encoding of finite sequences in natural
numbers:
(i) There are primitive recursive notations O ⊆ N ( for ordinals < Γ0), P ⊆ O (for principal
ordinals < Γ0), a primitive recursive relation ≺⊆ N×N, and an evaluation function | · |
defined as:
• 0 ∈ O and |0| = 0;
• n1, . . . , nm ∈ P and |n1| ≥ . . . ≥ |nm|, then (1, n1, . . . , nm) ∈ O and |(1, n1, . . . , nm)| =
|n1|+ . . .+ |nm|;
• if n1, n2 ∈ O, then (2, n1, n2) ∈ P and |(2, n1, n2)| = ϕ|n1|(|n2|)
• n ≺ m :↔ n ∈ O and m ∈ O and |n| < |m|
(ii) For every o ∈ O, |o| < Γ0; for every α < Γ0, there is an o ∈ O such that |o| = α.
For ordinals α < Γ0, we denote with a the corresponding numeral in the representation of O
and we do not distinguish between ordinal functions such as the Veblen functions and their
representations. Given the well-known identities ϕ0α = ω
α, and ϕ10 = ε0 we often employ, also
in formal contexts, the more familiar formulation of ordinals ≤ ε0.
The system (O,P,≺) enables us to formulate the following principles of transfinite induction:
∀a ≺ b φ(a),Γ⇒ ∆, φ(b)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀a ≺ ε0 φ(a)
(TIε0LT)
∀a ≺ b φ(a),Γ⇒ ∆, φ(b)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀a ≺ c φ(a) for all γ(= |c|) < ω
ω(TI<ω
ω
LT )
∀a ≺ b φ(a),Γ⇒ ∆, φ(b)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀a ≺ c φ(a) for all γ < ε0(TI
<ε0
LT )
2.2. Truth principles. The truth-theoretic components of our systems amount to the initial
sequents displayed in Table 1. In the table, the evaluation function val(·) can be taken to be
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primitive recursive; we employ the usual primitive recursive syntactic predicates CtermLT(x) (‘x
is a closed term of LT’), SentLT(x) (‘x is a sentence of LT’), Fml1LT(x) (x is a formula of LT with
one free variable’) and the following primitive recursive syntactic operations that we list on the
first column of the chart below accompanied by the corresponding intensional abbreviations:
function meaning abbreviation
sub(x, y, num(z)) ‘substituting y with the numeral for z in x’ x(z˙/y)
id(x, y) ‘equating x and y’ x=y
nid(x, y) ‘negating the equality between x and y’ x 6=y
ng(x) ‘negating x’ ¬x
dn(x) ‘negating twice x’ ¬¬x
and(x, y) ‘conjoining x and y’ x∧y
or(x, y) ‘disjoining x and y’ x∨y
all(x, y) ‘universally quantifying x w.r.t y’ ∀xy
ex(x, y) ‘existentially quantifying x w.r.t y’ ∃xy
tr(x) ‘prefixing a truth predicate to x’ Tx
sub(pφ(v)q, pvq, num(x)) ‘replacing in φ(v) the variable v with x’ pϕ(x˙)q
Definition 9.
(i) PKF is obtained by extending basic with (At1-2), (T1-2), (T6), (¬1-2), (∧1-2), (∨1-2),
(∀1-2), (∃1-2), (IND1);
(ii) PKF is obtained from PKF by allowing only formulas of L in instances of (IND1) and
adding (Reg1-2) to the resulting system;
(iii) PKF+ is obtained by extending PKF with TI<ε0LT ;
(iv) PKFS is obtained by adding (GG) to PKF. PKFS and PKF+S are defined accordingly.
My goal in this paper is to relate the theories just introduced with suitable variants of Fe-
ferman’s axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth. These variants are presented in the next
definition.
Definition 10.
(i) KF results from adding to basik: (At1-4), (T1-6), (¬3-4), (∧1-4), (∨1-4), (∀1-4), (∃1-4);
(ii) KF is obtained from KF by restricting (IND1) to L-formulas and adding (Reg1-2) to the
resulting system;
(iii) KFI results from KF once the restricted version of (IND1) is replaced with (IND2);
(iv) KFS the extension of KF with the combination, in disjunctive form, of (cm) and (cs),
that is:
⇒ ∀x(SentLT(x)→ Tx ∨ T¬x) ∨ ∀x(SentLT(x) ∧ T¬x→ ¬Tx)
Similarly for KFS and KFIS.
As anticipated, the way in which we will relate these two clusters of theories is by comparing
what PKF-like and KF-like theories prove true in the precise sense of comparing their theorems
of the form Tpφq.
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equations (At1) CtermLT(x),CtermLT(y),T(x=y) ⇒ val(x) = val(y)
(At2) CtermLT(x),CtermLT(y), val(x) = val(y) ⇒ T(x=y)
(At3) CtermLT(x),CtermLT(y),T(x 6=y) ⇒ val(x) 6= val(y)
(At4) CtermLT(x),CtermLT(y), val(x) 6= val(y) ⇒ T(x 6=y)
truth (T1) Tx⇒ TpTx˙q
ascriptions (T2) TpTx˙q⇒ Tx
(T3) T¬x⇒ Tp¬Tx˙q
(T4) Tp¬Tx˙q⇒ T¬x,¬SentLT(x)
(T5) ¬SentLT(x) ⇒ Tp¬Tx˙q
(T6) Tx⇒ SentLT(x)
(Reg1) SentLT(x),CtermLT(y),Tx(
˙val(y)/v) ⇒ Tx(y/v)
(Reg2) SentLT(x),CtermLT(y),Tx(y/v) ⇒ Tx( ˙val(y)/v)
(cm) SentLT(x) ⇒ Tx,T¬x
(cs) SentLT(x) ⇒ ¬Tx,¬T¬x
(GG) φ,¬φ⇒ ψ,¬ψ
propositional (¬1) SentLT(x),¬Tx⇒ T¬x
connectives (¬2) SentLT(x),T¬x⇒ ¬Tx
(¬3) SentLT(x),T¬¬x⇒ Tx
(¬4) SentLT(x),Tx⇒ T¬¬x
(∧1) SentLT(x∧y),T(x∧y) ⇒ Tx ∧ Ty
(∧2) SentLT(x∧y),Tx,Ty ⇒ T(x∧y)
(∧3) SentLT(x∧y),T¬(x∧y) ⇒ T¬x,T¬y
(∧4) SentLT(x∧y),T¬x ∨ T¬y ⇒ T¬(x∧y)
(∨1) SentLT(x∨y),T(x∨y) ⇒ Tx,Ty
(∨2) SentLT(x∨y),Tx ∨ Ty ⇒ T(x∨y)
(∨3) SentLT(x∨y),T¬(x∨y) ⇒ T¬x ∧ T¬y
(∨4) SentLT(x∨y),T¬x,T¬y ⇒ T¬(x∨y)
quantifiers (∀1) SentLT(∀vx),T(∀vx) ⇒ ∀uTx(u˙/v)
(∀2) SentLT(∀vx), ∀uTx(u˙/v) ⇒ T(∀vx)
(∀3) SentLT(∀vx),T¬(∀vx) ⇒ ∃uT¬x(u˙/v)
(∀4) SentLT(∀vx), ∃uT¬x(u˙/v) ⇒ T¬(∀vx)
(∃1) SentLT(∃vx),T(∃vx) ⇒ ∃uTx(u˙/v)
(∃2) SentLT(∃vx), ∃uTx(u˙/v) ⇒ T(∃vx)
(∃3) SentLT(∃vx),T¬(∃vx) ⇒ ∀uT¬x(u˙/v)
(∃4) SentLT(∃vx), ∀uT¬x(u˙/v) ⇒ T¬∃vx)
Table 1. initial sequents for truth
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Definition 11 (Internal theory). For any system S in LT considered in Definitions 9 and 10,
the ‘internal theory’ of S is
IS := {φ ∈ LT | S ` Tpφq}
For the sake of readability, we do not distinguish between derivability ‘`’ in PKF-like and KF-like
theories although, strictly speaking, the meaning of the turnstile shifts between the two clusters.
Let U be a PKF-like theory, that is one of the theories introduced in Def. 9. We have, by
induction on the complexity of φ ∈ LT and ψ ∈ L:
Lemma 3.
(i) (Intersubstitutivity) U ` Γ⇒ ∆,Tpφq if and only if U ` Γ⇒ ∆, φ, for any LT-sentence
φ;
(ii) U ` ψ ∨ ¬ψ, for ψ ∈ L.
Remark 2. Lemma 3 tells us that IU = U for U as above. By contrast, in KF-like theories (ii)
is trivially obtained for all φ ∈ LT; therefore the sentence λ ∨ ¬λ, for λ provably equivalent in
basik to ¬Tpλq, is already sufficient to establish that the set of theorems of a KF-like theory does
not coincide with its internal theory.
Although full intersubstitutivity is out of reach for KF-like theories, the full T-schema is
provable in them for formulas of L with free variables. This again by external induction of the
complexity of the formula involved:
Lemma 4. Let V be a KF-like theory as specified in Definition 10. Then for all formulas φ(~v)
of L, V proves
∀~x (Tpφ(~˙x)q↔ φ(~x))
We conclude this section by providing a formal rendering of the claim that PKF-like and KF-like
theories amount to two ways of axiomatizing the conception of truth associated to the framework
in [13]. By restricting our attention to the standard model N of L, it is well-known that the set
of (codes of) LT-sentences BDM-true in (N, S1, S2) enjoys a positive inductive definition in the
parameters S1 and S2.
4 To choose pairs (S1, S2) compatible with an intended interpretation of
the extension and antiextension of T, one can employ this definition to introduce the monotone
operator
Φ(S1, S2) :=
〈{φ ∈ SentLT | (N, S1, S2) DM φ},
(ω \ SentLT) ∪ {φ ∈ SentLT | (N, S1, S2) DM ¬φ}
〉
Crucially, fixed-points of Φ enjoy the following property, for all LT-sentences φ:
(N, S1, S2) DM Tpφq if and only if (N, S1, S2) DM φ and(2)
(N, S1, S2) DM ¬Tpφq if and only if (N, S1, S2) DM ¬φ(3)
The following lemma gives us at least a necessary condition for considering PKF and KF-like
theories as axiomatizations of fixed-point models. In this work it is harmless to consider it also
as a sufficient condition, although a thorough discussion of this criterion would likely lead to a
revision of this claim (see also [15]). We state the lemma for PKF and KF, but Lemma 5 clearly
holds for any other combination with the obvious adjustments to the satisfaction relation.
4Clearly so does the set of sentences SDM-true in (N, S1, S2) with S1 and S2 disjoint or exhaustive.
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Lemma 5. For (S1, S2) a fixed point of Φ,
(N, S1, S2) DM PKF iff (N, S1)  KF
This concludes the section devoted to the required preliminaries.
3. Soundness proofs in classical systems
Halbach and Horsten in [9] showed that the soundness proof for PKF with respect to fixed-point
models that lies at the root of Lemma 5 can be formalized in KFI. In doing so they proved the
inclusion of PKF in IKFI. In this section we show that this reasoning can be extended to other
PKF-like and KF-like theories from Definitions 9, 10. In what follows we write
∧
Γ(~x) (
∨
Γ(~x))
for the conjunction (disjunction) of the members of Γ, and ~x for the free variables appearing in
them.
Proposition 1. The claim ‘if U ` Γ⇒ ∆, then
V ` ∀~x
((
Tp∧Γ(~˙x)q→ Tp∨∆(~˙x)q) ∧ (Tp¬ ∨∆(~˙x)q→ Tp¬ ∧Γ(~˙x)q))’
holds for the following pairs of theories U, V : (PKF,KF), (PKF,KFI), (PKF+,KF), (PKFS 
,KFS), (PKFS,KFIS), (PKF+S ,KFS).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of a derivation in the PKF-like theories involved.
As in the proof of [9, Thm. 27], we only mention few paradigmatic cases. We also focus on some
cases that characterize PKF and PKF+ and their extensions with (GG) and that are therefore
not covered by Halbach and Horsten’s proof.
Let us consider for instance the case of (¬1). We reason in KF so that it is clear that the
same reasoning goes through in the cases of its extensions. For the first conjunct, we have:
⇒ TpSentLT(x˙)q ∧ T¬pTx˙q→ T¬x by Lemma 4, (T4)
⇒ TpSentLT(x˙)q ∧ ¬Tx˙q→ TpT¬x˙q by (T1-2)
For the second conjunct, we reason as follows:
⇒ T¬pT¬x˙q→ T¬¬x ∨ Tp¬SentLT(x˙)q by (T4), Lemma 4
⇒ T¬pT¬x˙q→ T¬¬pTx˙q ∨ Tp¬SentLT(x˙)q by (T1), (¬4)
⇒ T¬pT¬x˙q→ Tp¬(SentLT(x˙) ∧ ¬Tx˙)q by (∧4)
In theories forcing symmetric models we need to deal with the initial sequent (GG) (cf. Def.
9(iv)), that is, we need to show, in a suitable KF-like theory augmented with either (cs) or (cm),
(4) ⇒ (Tpφ ∧ ¬φq→ Tpψ ∨ ¬ψq) ∧ (Tp¬(ψ ∨ ¬ψ)q→ Tp¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)q)
We consider the second conjunct only as the reasoning for the first is simpler. If (cs), then
Tp¬(ψ ∨ ¬ψ)q⇒ ∃x(SentLT(x) ∧ T¬x ∧ Tx) by (∨3), (¬3)
Tp¬(ψ ∨ ¬ψ)q⇒ Tp¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)q by (cs) and K
The case in which (cm) holds is particularly easy as the desired conclusion follows from the
instance ⇒ Tpφq ∨ Tp¬φq of (cm) by (¬4), (∧4) and logic.
As an example of a rule of inference, we consider (¬R), which also highlights the role of both
conjuncts in the argument. For simplicity, we omit free variables. By induction hypothesis, a
KF-like theory proves
⇒ Tp∧Γq→ Tp∨¬∆q(5)
⇒ Tp¬∨¬∆q→ Tp¬∧Γq(6)
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We require
⇒ Tp∧∆q→ Tp∨¬Γq(7)
⇒ Tp¬∨¬Γq→ Tp¬∧∆q(8)
For (7), we have in a KF-like theory:
⇒ Tpδ0 ∧ . . . ∧ δn−1q→ Tp¬¬δ0q ∧ . . . ∧ Tp¬¬δn−1q by (∧1), (¬4)
→ T¬(p¬δ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬δn−1q) by (∨4)
→ Tp¬(γ0 ∧ . . . ∧ γm−1)q by (6)
→ Tp¬γ0 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬γm−1q by (∧3), (∨2)
The reasoning for (8) is analogous, with the crucial contribution of (5).
We now deal with the induction rule of PKF. The same argument clearly goes through for
PKFS and KFS. By induction hypothesis, KF proves
⇒ Tp∧Γ ∧ φ(x˙)q→ Tpφ( ˙x+ 1) ∨ ∨∆q(9)
⇒ Tp¬(∨∆ ∨ φ( ˙x+ 1))q→ Tp¬(∧Γ ∧ φ(x˙))q(10)
for a standard L-formula φ(v). To deal with the first conjunct of the main claim, by (∧2), (∨1),
and Lemma 4 applied to (9), we obtain
⇒ Tp∧Γq ∧ φ(x)→ φ(x+ 1) ∨ Tp∨∆q
Therefore also
⇒ Tp∧Γ ∧ φ(0)q→ Tpφ(y˙) ∨ ∨∆q
by the induction rule of KF, Lemma 4 and the truth rules for propositional connectives. For
the second conjunct, we want to obtain
(11) ⇒ Tp¬(∨∆ ∨ φ(y˙))q→ Tp¬(∧Γ ∧ φ(0))q
By (10), (∨4), (∨3) and Lemma 4, KF proves
(12) ⇒ Tp¬∨∆q ∧ ¬φ(x+ 1)→ Tp¬∧Γq ∨ ¬φ(x)
By propositional logic and the induction schema of KF,
(13) ⇒ Tp¬∨∆q ∧ ¬Tp¬∧Γq→ (φ(0)→ φ(y))
from which we obtain (11) by propositional logic, Lemma 4 and (∧4), (∨3).
We conclude with the rule TI<ε0LT of PKF
+ and PKF+S by crucially employing the fact that KF
(and therefore KFS) proves TI
<ε0
LT by a simple adaptation of Gentzen’s lower bound proof for PA.
Assuming that the following sequents are derivable in KF,
⇒ Tp∧Γ ∧ ∀z ≺ a˙ φ(z)q→ Tpφ(a˙) ∨ ∨∆q(14)
⇒ Tp¬(∨∆ ∨ φ(a˙))q→ Tp¬(∀z ≺ a˙ φ(z) ∧ ∧Γ)q(15)
we show
⇒ Tp∧Γq→ Tp∀z ≺ c˙ φ(z)q ∨ ∨∆q(16)
⇒ Tp¬(∨∆ ∨ ∀z ≺ c˙ φ(z))q→ Tp¬∧Γq(17)
for all c such that |c| < ε0.
For (16), we obtain by the induction hypothesis, Lemma 4, (∧2), (∨1), (∀2), and TI<ε0LT ,
(18) Tp∧Γq⇒ ∀z ≺ cTpφ(z˙)q ∨ Tp∨∆q
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for all suitable c. The desired conclusion is then obtained by Lemma 4, (∨2), (∀2) and propo-
sitional logic. For (17), we start with (15) and obtain by logic and the truth principles for
∨,∀:
(19) Tp¬∨∆q,Tp¬φ(a˙)q⇒ ∃z ≺ aTp¬φ(z˙)q,Tp¬∧Γq
Therefore, by logic and TI<ε0LT ,
(20) Tp¬∨∆q⇒ ∀z ≺ c ¬Tp¬φ(z˙)q,Tp¬∧Γq
for all suitable c. Finally, by logic and the truth principles for ∨,∀:
(21) ⇒ Tp¬(∨∆ ∨ ∀z ≺ c˙ φ(z))q→ Tp¬∧Γq

Proposition 1 obviously yields an upper bound for the arithmetical sentences provable in a
PKF-like theory, given the following correspondence between KF-like theories and systems of
ramified analysis (cf. [4]) studied in [3]:
(i) KF and KFS have the same L-theorems as PA.
(ii) KFI and KFIS have the same arithmetical theorems as ramified analysis (or ramified
truth) up to ωω, or PA + TI<ϕω0L .
(iii) KF and KFS have the same arithmetical theorems as ramified analysis (or ramified truth)
up to ε0, or PA + TI
<ϕε00
L .
Moreover, we immediately obtain the inclusion of PKF-like theories in the internal theories of
the corresponding KF-like theories.
Corollary 1.
(i) PKF⊆ IKF and PKFS⊆ IKFS;
(ii) PKF ⊆ IKFI and PKFS ⊆ IKFIS;
(iii) PKF+ ⊆ IKF and PKF+S ⊆ IKFS.
The next section addresses the question whether the above inclusions are proper or not.
4. Levels of truth in PKF-like theories
The present section settles the question of the relationships between PKF-like theories and the
internal theories of the corresponding KF-like theories. The resulting picture provides an answer
to a series of questions left open in [9]. We begin by sketching a result proved in [17] about
theories with restricted induction.
Lemma 6. For any φ ∈ LT, if KF (KFS) proves Tpφq, then PKF (PKFS) proves φ.
Proof Sketch. For details, we refer to [17]. We reason for KF and PKF but it should be clear
how to proceed in the case of KFS.
Assuming PKF 0 φ, we show KF 0 Tpφq. By the completeness theorem for BDM (and
extensions thereof) one of the following must hold:
(1) there is a four-valued model (M, S1, S2) of PKF such that (M, S1, S2) 2DM φ;
(2) there is a four-valued model (M, S1, S2) of PKF such that (M, S1, S2) DM ¬φ.
The case in which (1) holds is the easiest. We first notice, by induction on the length of the
derivation in KF, that (M, S1)  KF. If KF` Tpφq, therefore, pφq ∈ S1 and (M, S1, S2) DM φ
by Lemma 3, quod non by (1).
If (2) holds, there are three sub-cases.
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Sub-case 1: (M, S1, S2) is consistent (cf. Def. 1(ii)). By assuming KF` Tpφq, we obtain
pφq ∈ S1 because (M, S1)  KF, contradicting the consistency of (M, S1, S2).
Sub-case 2: (M, S1, S2) is complete. In this case we can consider (M, R1, R2) obtained from
(M, S1, S2) by turning truth-value gluts into truth-value gaps. This consistent model satisfies
PKF and all sequents satisfied by (M, S1, S2). We can then reason as in sub-case 1.
Sub-case 3: (M, S1, S2) contains both truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts. Again we move
to the consistent model (M, R1, R2) obtained by turning gluts into gaps. This model, besides
being a model of PKF, satisfies all sequents of the form ⇒ φ satisfied by (M, S1, S2). Again we
can now reason in the first sub-case.

4.1. Classical truth predicates in PKF-like theories. We now recall the well-known fact
that there is a strict correspondence between the amount of transfinite induction for LT-formulas
provable in PKF-like theories and the amount of classical, Tarskian truth predicates definable in
them.
Definition 12. We let, for α < Γ0,
L0 := ∅ L1 := L
Lα+1 := Lα ∪ {Ta} with α ≥ 1 Lλ :=
⋃
β<λ
Lβ
with Tax :↔ SentLa(x) ∧ Tx, again α ≥ 1.
Lemma 7 (essentially [9, Lem. 32-33]).
(i) PKF ` ∀x(SentL(x)→ (Tx ∨ ¬Tx))
(ii) For α < Γ0,
PKF ` ∀z < a(SentLz (x)→ (Tx ∨ ¬Tx))⇒ SentLa(x)→ (Tx ∨ ¬Tx)
Proof Sketch. (i) is proved by formal induction on the complexity of the sentence involved. The
claim is trivial if x is atomic, i.e. of the form u=v, for u, v formal closed terms. For the induction
step, one notices that PKF proves sequents of the form (cf. [8, Lem. 16.15])5
SentLT(x),Tx ∨ ¬Tx⇒ T¬x ∨ ¬T¬x(22)
SentLT(x∧y),Tx ∨ ¬Tx,Ty ∨ ¬Ty ⇒ T(x∧y) ∨ ¬T(x∧y)(23)
SentLT(∀vx),∀yTx(y˙/v) ∨ ¬∀yTx(y˙/v)⇒ T(∀vx) ∨ ¬T(∀vx)(24)
For (ii), it suffices to assume that 1 < α < Γ0. If α is a successor ordinal, we perform again
an induction on the length of y to show
(25) SentLa(x)→ Tx ∨ ¬Tx⇒ SentLa+1(y)→ Ty ∨ ¬Ty
In particular, to prove (25) we need (22)-(24) and
(26) Tx ∨ ¬Tx⇒ TpTx˙q ∨ ¬TpTx˙q
which is in turn obtained by (T1), (T2). The case in which α is a limit ordinal is immediate by
definition of Lλ. 
5Similar facts are provable for the omitted cases of ∨ and ∃.
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Lemma 7 immediately entails that , if S ⊇ PKF proves TI<αLT , then S also proves Tbx ∨ ¬Tbx
for β < α. As a consequence, in such a theory S we can (i) reason classically with all truth
predicates Tbx (see Remark 1); (ii) define classical ramified truth predicates for all β < α. We
have, in particular:
Corollary 2.
(i) PKF ` Tax ∨ ¬Tax for all α < ωω. The same holds for PKFS.
(ii) PKF+ ` Tax ∨ ¬Tax for all α < ε0. The same holds for PKF+S .
4.2. The asymmetric interpretation formalized. In this section we formalize, in suitable
PKF-like theories, a method introduced by Cantini in [3, §5] to assign indices to truth predicates
occurring in normalized KFI- and KF-derivations. Again we focus on the theories without the
initial sequents (cs) or (cm), but the proofs adapt to these extensions without essential modifi-
cations.
We first reformulate KF-like theories in a one-sided Tait-style calculus. As usual, negation ¬
is now defined via the De Morgan laws starting from the atomic formulas r = s, r 6= s,Tr,¬Tr
– we refer to these latter two kinds of formulas as truth ascriptions. We still call the resulting
language LT. Γ,∆ . . . range over finite sets of formulas and r, s, t . . . over arbitrary terms of LT.
Definition 13.
(i) TKFI is formulated in LT and its axioms are:
Logic and identity:
Γ, φ,¬φ with φ atomic
Γ, s = s Γ, s 6= t,¬φ(s), φ(t) with φ atomic
Γ, s 6= t, t = s Γ, s 6= t, t 6= r, s = r
Arithmetic:
Γ,Sr 6= 0 Γ,Sr 6= St, r = t
Equations for suitable p.r. function symbols
Truth axioms:
Γ,¬CtermLT(x),¬CtermLT(y),¬T(x=y), val(x) = val(y)
Γ,¬CtermLT(x),¬CtermLT(y), val(x) 6= val(y),T(x=y)
Γ,¬CtermLT(x),¬CtermLT(y),¬T(x 6=y), val(x) 6= val(y)
Γ,¬CtermLT(x),¬CtermLT(y), val(x) = val(y),T(x 6=y)
Γ,¬Tx, SentLT(x)
Γ,¬Fml1LT(x, v),¬CtermLT(y),¬Tx( ˙val(y)/v),Tx(y/v)
Γ,¬Fml1LT(x, v),¬CtermLT(y),¬Tx(y/v),Tx( ˙val(y)/v)
Its rules of inference are:
Standard logical principles including (cf. [21]) (Cut)
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Γ, φ Γ,¬φ
(Cut)
Γ
Γ, (¬)Tz
(Trp)
Γ, (¬)TpTz˙q
Γ, (¬)(T¬z ∨ ¬SentLT(z))
(Tnrp)
Γ, (¬)T¬pTz˙q
Γ,SentLT(x) Γ, (¬)Tx
(Tdn)
Γ, (¬)T¬¬x
Γ, SentLT(x∧y) Γ, (¬)(Tx ∧ Ty) (T&)
Γ, (¬)T(x∧y)
Γ,SentLT(x∧y) Γ, (¬)(T¬x ∨ T¬y)
(T¬&)
Γ, (¬)T¬(x∧y)
Γ, SentLT(x∨y) Γ, (¬)(Tx ∨ Ty)
(Tor)
Γ, (¬)T(x∨y)
Γ,SentLT(x∨y) Γ, (¬)(T¬x ∧ T¬y)
(Tnor)
Γ, (¬)T¬(x∨y)
Γ, SentLT(∀vx) Γ, (¬)∀yTx(y˙/v)
(Tall)
Γ, (¬)T∀vx
Γ,SentLT(∀vx) Γ, (¬)∃yT¬x(y˙/v)
(Tnall)
Γ, (¬)T¬∀vx
Γ, SentLT(∃vx) Γ, (¬)∃yTx(y˙/v)
(Tex)
Γ, (¬)T∃vx
Γ,SentLT(∃vx) Γ, (¬)∀yT¬x(y˙/v)
(Tnex)
Γ, (¬)T¬∃vx
Γ,Tx(p0q/v) Γ, ∀y (Tx(y˙/v) → Tx( ˙y + 1/v))
(Tind)
Γ,Tx(u˙/v)
with u not free in Γ,Tx(p0q/v).
(ii) TKF is obtained by replacing (Tind) with the schema, for φ(v) an arbitrary formula of
LT with only v free:6
Γ, φ(0) Γ,∀y (φ(y)→ φ(y + 1))
(Ind)
Γ,∀xφ
It is not difficult to see that TKFI and TKF contain KFI and KF respectively.
Notation. The length of a derivation-tree D is defined inductively as the supremum of the lengths
of its sub-derivations plus 1. The complexity of a formula of LT is 0 for atomic formulas and is
extended to complex formulas in the usual way. The cut rank of D is defined as the maximum
complexity of its cut-formulas. As usual, S `kl Γ expresses that Γ is derivable in S with a proof
of finite length ≤ k and cut-rank ≤ l: therefore S `k Γ conveys the information that Γ has a
proof with cuts only applied to atomic formulas (normal cuts). This relation can be canonically
represented in arithmetic via a recursively enumerable predicate BewS(k, l, pΓq).
Lemma 8 (Partial cut-elimination). The following is provable in basic plus (IND1), with 2x0 := x
and 2xn+1 := 2
2xn :
BewTKFI(y, u, pΓq) → BewTKFI(2yu, 0, pΓq)
We now assign indices to truth predicates involved in derivations with only normal cuts by
formalizing [3, Thm. 9.9] in PKF. In particular, we introduce the predicates Trba(x) that formalize
the capture the idea of an asymmetric interpretation of the construction of the minimal fixed-
point of Kripke’s theory of truth. The role of these predicates is essential in evaluating truth
ascriptions and their intended meaning can be described as follows: if Trba(Tpφq), then the
sentence φ is definitely true at the level β of the construction of the minimal fixed point; if
Trba(¬Tpφq), then φ is not yet true at level α of the construction.
Definition 14. We inductively define the predicate Trba(z) for α, β < Γ0 applying to (codes
of) sentences of LT. We make use of the Tarskian, hierarchical truth predicates introduced in
6In this case the last two truth axioms become redundant.
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Definition 12.
Trba(u=v) :↔ val(u) = val(v) Trba(u 6=v) :↔ val(u) 6= val(v)
Trba(Tu) :↔ Tbval(u) Trba(¬Tu) :↔ ¬Taval(u)
Trba(u∧v) :↔ Trba(u) ∧ Trba(v) Trba(¬(u∧v)) :↔ Trba(¬u) ∨ Trba(¬v)
Trba(u∨v) :↔ Trba(u) ∨ Trba(v) Trba(¬(u∨v)) :↔ Trba(¬u) ∧ Trba(¬v)
Trba(∀vu) :↔ ∀yTrba(u(y˙/v)) Trba(¬∀vu) :↔ ∃yTrba(¬u(y˙/v))
Trba(∃vu) :↔ ∃yTrba(u(y˙/v)) Trba(¬∃vu) :↔ ∀yTrba(¬u(y˙/v))
The definition extends to (codes of) sets Γ of substitutional instances of LT-formulas by consid-
ering the disjunction of the elements of Γ.
Lemma 9. For δ < Γ0 and 1 ≤ α < β < γ < δ, if U ⊇ PKF and U ` TIδLT , then
U ` ∀x (SentLT(x) ∧ Trcb(x)→ Trda(x))
Proof. The proof is by formal induction on the construction of x. We consider the crucial cases
of truth ascriptions. The others are easily obtained. We reason in U .
If Trcb(Ty), then Tcval(y) by Def. 14. Also, for α < β < δ, we can prove by induction on x:
(27) ⇒ ¬Tax,Tbx
Therefore Tdval(y). Similarly, if Tr
c
b(¬Ty), we obtain ¬Tbval(y) and, again by (27), ¬Taval(y). 
Proposition 2. For n ∈ ω, 1 ≤ α < ωω, PKF ` BewTKFI(n, 0, pΓ(~˙y)q)→ Tra+ω
n
a (pΓ(~˙y)q).
Proof. The proof is by meta-induction on n. We argue informally in PKF: in particular, when
referring to claims derivable in PKF of the form ⇒ Γ, we often simply write Γ. For readability,
we also omit the additional parameters in side formulas.
n = 0. If Γ is of the form Γ′, φ,¬φ, with φ atomic, then either Γ is of the form Γ′, r = s, r 6= s
or of the form Γ′,Tx,¬Tx. In the former case we are done by Lemma 3(ii); in the latter, we
employ Corollary 2 and (27) to conclude ¬Tax,Ta+1x and therefore Tra+1a (pΓ′q),¬Tax,Ta+1x.
The desired conclusion then follows from Definition 14. The case of the identity axioms is trivial.
If Γ is an instance of the first truth axiom, one simply notices that
⇒ ¬CtermLT(x),¬CtermLT(y),¬Ta(x=y), val(x) = val(y)
holds for all α < ωω. We are then done by applying Definition 14. If Γ is for the form
Γ′,¬Tx,SentLT(x), it suffices to notice that ¬Tax, SentLT(x) holds. If Γ is of the form
Γ′,¬Fml1LT(x, v),¬CtermLT(y),¬Tx( ˙val(y)/v),Tx(y/v),
then we have for all α < ωω,
⇒ ¬Fml1LT(x, v),¬Tax( ˙val(y)/v),Tax(y/v) by (Reg1-2)
⇒ ¬Fml1LT(x, v),¬Tax( ˙val(y)/v),Ta+1x(y/v) by Lemma 9
The desired conclusion follows then by Definition 14.
n > 0. We first consider a proof pi in TKFI of length n ending with an application of (Trp):
...pi0 :
Γ′,Tz
pi :
Γ′,TpTz˙q
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By induction hypothesis, for α < ωω, since pi0 has length ≤ n0 < n, we have Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q, pTz˙q),
that is Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q), Ta+ωn0 z. But then already PA suffices to prove SentLa+ωn (pTz˙q) and
TpTz˙q holds by the axioms for truth ascriptions. Therefore also Tra+ω
n
a (pΓ′q), Ta+ωnpTz˙q by
Lemma 9. By applying Definition 14 we obtained the desired conclusion for each external α < Γ0.
To complete the treatment of (Trp), we now consider a proof pi in TKFI of length n ending with:
...pi0 :
Γ′,¬Tz
pi :
Γ′,¬TpTz˙q
Again, since the length of pi0 is ≤ n0 < n we have, for all α < ωω, Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′,¬Tz˙q), that is
Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q), ¬Taz. However, it is an arithmetical fact that SentLa(pTz˙q) entails SentLa(z),
therefore, by Lemma 9 and (T1-2),
⇒ Tra+ωna (pΓ′q),¬TpTz˙q,¬SentLa(pTz˙q)
which yields the claim by Definition 14. The cases for (Tnrp) are treated similarly.
For the Boolean connectives, we consider (T&), first focusing on a proof pi of length n ending
with:
...pi0 :
Γ′,SentLT(x∧y)
...pi1 :
Γ′,Tx ∧ Ty
pi :
Γ′,T(x∧y)
Let pi0, pi1 be of length≤ n0 < n. By induction hypothesis and Definition 14, Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q),SentLT(x∧
y), and Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0x∧Ta+ωn0 y are derivable in PKF; therefore Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0 (x∧
y) by the behaviour of Ta+ωn0 , and Tr
a+ωn
a (pΓ′,Tx˙∧y˙q) by Definition 14 and Lemma 9. If pi
ends with:
...pi0 :
Γ′,SentLT(x∧y)
...pi1 :
Γ′,¬(Tx ∧ Ty)
pi :
Γ′,¬T(x∧y)
As before, since pi0, pi1 have length ≤ n0 < n, by induction hypothesis Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q),¬Tax,¬Tay
is a derivable sequent in PKF. Therefore Tra+ω
n0
a (pΓ′q), ¬Ta(x∧y) will also be derivable since
¬SentLax,¬Tx entails ¬SentLa(x∧y),¬T(x∧y). Therefore Tra+ω
n
a (pΓ′,¬T(x˙∧y˙)q) by Definition
14 and Lemma 9.
Let a proof in TKFI end with an application of (Tind) – where, for readability, we have
suppressed the substituted variable:
...pi0 :
Γ′,Tx(p0q)
...pi1 :
Γ′,¬Tx(y˙),Tx( ˙y + 1)
pi :
Γ′,Tx(u˙)
with u arbitrary. Since pi0, pi1 have length ≤ n0 < n, the induction hypothesis gives us, for all
α < ωω:
⇒ Tra+ωn0a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0x(p0q)(28)
⇒ Tra+ωn0a (pΓ′q),¬Tax(y˙),Ta+ωn0x( ˙y + 1)(29)
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By Definition 14, it suffices to obtain Tra+ω
n
a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωnx(u˙) for an arbitrary u; this, however,
would follow by applying Lemma 9 to
(30) ⇒ Tra+ωn0+1a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0 (u˙+1)x(u˙)
again for u arbitrary. To derive (30), we employ (IND1). (28) gives us directly the claim for
u = 0. Let β := α+ ωn0(y + 1). We have, in PKF,
⇒ Trb+ωn0b (pΓ′q),¬Tbx(y˙),Tb+ωn0x( ˙y + 1) by (29)
⇒ Tra+ωn0+1a (pΓ′q),¬Tbx(y˙),Tb+ωn0x( ˙y + 1) by Lemma 9
Ta+ωn0 (y˙+1)x(y˙)⇒ Tra+ω
n0+1
a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0 (y˙+2)x( ˙y + 1) Cor. 2, def. β
⇒ Tra+ωn0+1a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0 (u˙+1)x(u˙) (IND1)
⇒ Tra+ωn0+1a (pΓ′q),Ta+ωn0+1x(u˙) Lemma 9
The last line, as anticipated, yields the claim by Definition 14 and, possibly, Lemma 9 as ωn0+1 ≤
ωn.
The case of a proof ending with an application of the cut rule is the crucial case when the
presence of the negative clause of our formalization of the asymmetric interpretation matters –
that is the ordinal subscript a in Trba(x). So if our proof pi ends with an application of the cut
rule
...pi0 :
Γ′,Ts
...pi1 :
Γ′,¬Ts
pi :
Γ′
we have that pi0, pi1 ≤ m < n. By induction hypothesis, for β < ωω,
Trb+ω
m
b (pΓ′q),Tb+ωmval(s)(31)
Trb+ω
m
b (pΓ′q),¬Tbval(s)(32)
By applying Lemma 9 to (31) we obtain
Trb+ω
m·2
b (pΓ′q),Tb+ωmval(s)(33)
Moreover, by letting β to be β + ωm in (32) and applying Lemma 9 to the result, we obtain
Trb+ω
m·2
b (pΓ′q),¬Tb+ωmval(s)(34)
Since ωm · 2 < ωn, we obtain the desired result by Lemma 9 and cut. 
Corollary 3. For φ an LT-sentence, if KFI ` Tpφq, then PKF ` φ.
Proof. If KFI ` Tpφq, by Lemma 8 PKF also proves BewTKFI(n, 0, pTpφqq) for some n ∈ ω.
Therefore, still in PKF, Proposition 2 gives us Tωnpφq, and hence φ by Lemma 3. 
Next we apply a modification of this strategy to KF. Since an analogue of Lemma 8 (partial
cut elimination) is not available for TKF, we move to the infinitary system KF∞.
Definition 15. The theory KF∞ is obtained from TKF by
(i) omitting free variables
(ii) replacing arithmetical axioms with the initial sequents
Γ, r = s Γ, r 6= s
whenever r, s are closed terms and, respectively, rN = sN and rN 6= sN.
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(iii) replacing (Ind) and the logical rule of introduction of the universal quantifier with the
infinitary rule:
Γ, φ(s) for any closed term s
(ω)
Γ,∀xφ(x)
Derivations in KF∞ are now possibly infinite as (ω) has infinitely many premises. However, it
is well-known (cf. [21, 20]) that we can restrict our attention to recursive applications of the ω-
rule by considering (the index for) a primitive recursive enumeration of the premises: derivations
become well-founded trees whose nodes are either (codes of) the root, or codes of instances of
axioms, or the result of applying a unary, binary, or ω-rule to codes of the premises. In all these
cases codes also contain information about the length, cut-rank of the coded derivations. This
enables us to find a predicate Bew∞(a, n, pΓq) expressing that there is a tree whose nodes are
‘locally correct’ in the sense just specified and that KF∞ `αn Γ, that is Γ is derivable in KF∞
with a derivation of ordinal length ≤ α and cut rank ≤ n.
The following lemma states the well-known fact that the transfinite induction of PKF+ enables
us to formalize the embedding and partial cut elimination for externally given proofs, where ϕm0 α
stands for m iterations of ϕ0· on α.
Lemma 10 (Cf. [21, 3, 18]).
(i) (Embedding). PKF+ ` BewKF(n,m, pΓq)→ Bew∞(ω2,m, pΓq), for all n,m ∈ ω.
(ii) (Partial Cut-Elimination). For α < ε0, PKF
+ ` Bew∞(a,m, pΓq)→ Bew∞(ϕm0 a, 0, pΓq)
Lemma 10 tells us that we can restrict our attention to derivations of cut-rank 0. We can finally
proceed with an analogue of Proposition 2. We notice that there are no free variables now in the
claim.
Proposition 3. For 1 ≤ α, β < ε0, PKF+ ` Bew∞(a, 0, pΓq)→ Trb+2
a
b (pΓq)
Proof. The proof proceeds by external, transfinite induction on α < ε0. As most of the cases
follow the blueprint of Proposition 3, I only focus on the cut rule: the argument is structurally
similar to the case of the cut rule in Proposition 2, but the change on the ordinal bounds and its
relevance to the main claim makes it worth repeating. The case of the rule (ω) for limit ordinals
is also immediate given the definition of the predicate Tr··(·).
Let’s assume that our proof pi ends with an application of the cut rule:
...pi0 :
Γ′,Ts
...pi1 :
Γ′,¬Ts
pi :
Γ′
with pi0, pi1 of length ≤ γ < α < ε0. By induction hypothesis, for β < ε0,
Trb+2
c
b (pΓ′q),Tb+2cval(s)(35)
Trb+2
c
b (pΓ′q),¬Tbval(s)(36)
Therefore we obtain
Trb+2
c·2
b (pΓ′q),Tb+2cval(s)(37)
Trb+2
c·2
b (pΓ′q),¬Tb+2cval(s)(38)
by applying, respectively, Lemma 9 to (35), and by letting β to be β+ 2γ in (36) before applying
Lemma 9 to the result. An application of the cut rule – and possibly Lemma 9 since 2γ · 2 ≤ 2α
– yields Trb+2
a
b (pΓ′q) as desired. 
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Corollary 4. For all LT-sentences φ, if KF ` Tpφq, then PKF+ ` φ.
Proof. If KF ` Tpφq then, for some n ∈ ω, PKF+ proves Bew∞(ω2, n, pTpϕqq) and therefore,
by Lemma 10(ii), also Bew∞(a, 0, pTpϕqq) for some α < ε0. By Proposition 3, Tcpφq for some
γ < ε0 is provable in PKF
+ and so is φ by Lemma 3. 
It is worth stressing again here that the strategy pursued in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
clearly goes through without changes in the ordinal bounds even if, instead of KFI and KF, we
focus on the case of KFIS and KFS.
5. Summary of the results and philosophical assessment
Corollary 1, together with Lemma 6, Corollaries 3 and 4, yields the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
(i) PKF= IKF and PKFS= IKFS;
(ii) PKF = IKFI and PKFS = IKFIS;
(iii) PKF+ = IKF and PKF+S = IKFS.
IKFS
IKF
PKF+S
PKF+
IKF
IKFS
PKF
PKFS
IKFI
IKFIS
PKF
PKFS
TI<ε0L
TI<ε0LT ,TI
<ϕε00
L
TI<ω
ω
LT ,TI
<ϕω0
L
Figure 1. The content of Thm. 1
The content of Theorem 1 is summarized in Figure 1. The arrows stand for theory inclusion: on
the leftmost column one can find the levels of transfinite induction with and without the truth
predicate corresponding to the relevant PKF-like and internal KF-like theories. Here I briefly
sketch some direction for a philosophical evaluation of the results presented above: a proper
philosophical assessment is deferred to forthcoming work.
One might think, as Reinhardt [19] did, of KF-like theories as devices to grasp the core of
Kripke’s construction. This project is clearly doomed if it is read in analogy with Hilbert’s pro-
gram as reducing the reasoning available in fixed-point models to proofs in KF-like theories. This
is because, due to the close connections between the sequent arrow and the material conditional
PROVABLY TRUE SENTENCES ACROSS AXIOMATIZATIONS OF KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH 21
in the axioms of KF-like theories, none of these axioms will be sound with respect to fixed-
point models.7 Reinhardt’s project, in this sense, is completely superseded by the formulation
of Halbach’s and Horsten’s PKF and its variants.
But there may be another sense in which Reinhardt’s original program can be rescued. Starting
with Feferman’s famous remark ‘nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried on
in. . . [Basic De Morgan Logics]’ ([5, p. 95]), several authors have advocated the view that the
costs of abandoning classical logic – in our case, preferring PKF-like theories over KF-like theories
– surpass the advantages given by the intersubstitutivity of φ and Tpφq in all contexts [16, 8, 17,
23].8 According to this line of reasoning, abandoning classical logic cripples the links between
semantics and other chunks of science and philosophy. The asymmetry of provable transfinite
induction between KF and PKF amounts therefore to a clear example of non-semantic patterns
of reasoning that one has to give up when endorsing logics such as BDM. Other authors, such
as Reinhardt [19], defend classical theories, and in particular KF, as devices to retrieve IKF that,
besides being a set of sentences true in any fixed-point model, displays some virtues in dealing
with strengthened liar challenges.
For both kinds of supporters of KF-like solutions Theorem 1 offers the possibility of refining
their positions in a way that also seems to rescue the analogy with Hilbert’s programme suggested
by Reinhardt. Just like Hilbert [10], who intended to give a solid basis to the mathematicians’
work in ‘the paradise which Cantor has created for [them]’ by admitting, for any proof involving
ideal elements, a real counterpart, the advocate of KF (in both forms) may look at any of
its theorems of the form Tpφq and take for granted the existence of a proof of φ in PKF+,
therefore involving only principles of reasoning sound with respect to fixed point models. Under
this reading, one appears to be free to employ KF and enjoy its alleged advantages, therefore,
without being pushed away from the paradise Kripke has pointed us at.
By contrast, according to the proponent of PKF-like theories, the intersubstitutivity of φ and
Tpφq and the ‘silence’ of PKF with respect to paradoxical sentences is preferable to keeping
classical logic, which can nonetheless be recaptured for relevant portions of the language (cf.
Lemma 3). For such authors the way in which intersubstitutivity fails in KF-theories, i.e. via
the provability of claims of the form (¬Tpλq∧λ)∨ (Tpλq∧¬λ), is a sufficient reason to consider
classical theories as inadequate accounts of truth ([7, 11]). Also for such positions, Theorem 1
proves to be relevant: if challenged with the alleged clumsiness and weakness of the inferential
structure of, say, PKF, its advocate may reply that theorems of PKF can be reached in a classical
manner, that is via KFI. Furthermore, this classical detour is by no means ad hoc, as it is
adequate in the sense of Lemma 5.
We conclude by pointing at some possible extensions of our study. It is natural to ask, for
instance, whether a KF-like theory that is proof-theoretically stronger than KF proves the same
sentences true as a natural extension of PKF with more transfinite induction. A pair of theories
to test in this respect may be on the one hand John Burgess’ strengthening of KF (called BKF
in [8, §17]) that is as strong as ramified truth up to Γ0 or ID1, on the other PKF plus TI<Γ0LT .
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to look for a uniform and justified way to reach IKF without
departing from the hierarchy of PKF-like theories: to this end, a hierarchy of reflection principles
on a version of BDM extended with weak arithmetical axioms and initial sequents of the form
7This is essentially the content of of [9, Thm. 8].
8Elsewhere I will attempt to consider the cases of PKF-like theories and KF-like theories and the content of
Theorem 1 as case studies for isolating the abductive virtues and drawbacks of both sides and apply them to the
broader issue of logical pluralism. Here I limit myself to sketch how the picture resulting from Theorem 1 can be
relevant for the positions considered above.
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Tpφq ⇒ φ and φ ⇒ Tpφq may be tested. Some initial steps in this direction have been carried
out in [14], although it is still an open question whether finitely many applications of reflection
may lead from this basic starting point to IKF.
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